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Abstract 
Neo-liberalism is revival of liberalism that is radically dismantling the state and sifting power to the 
private sector. People favour welfare state and oppose any move against it. This paper attempts to 
gauge the protest in West Bengal against neo-liberalism. The recent protest in West Bengal that led 
to the electoral defeat of the Left Front is not only about land acquisition and loss of livelihood. 
Instead, it goes to the core of over three decades of left rule and raises serious questions about the 
policies adopted by the Left Front governments.  
This paper demonstrates that land reform and decentralisation of rural power, through institutions of 
local government, consolidated the authority of the CPI-M in the state but were detrimental to 
capital formation, necessary for industrialisation. Lack of adequate capital forced the left leadership 
to lure private investors to cope with the instability caused by increased aspiration in a globalised 
set up coupled with technological innovation. This being paradoxical to the political doctrine of the 
left resulted in a tension in the midst of an already unstable situation caused by economic stagnation 
and lack of adequate job creation in the state. The actions of the government to ward off the protests 
raise moral questions as to whether the CPI-M has the authority to claim to be representing the 
poor.    
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1. Introduction 
Neo-liberalism is a development doctrine which advocates transferring control of the economy from 
public to the private sector and supports economic liberalization, free trade and open markets. Neo-
liberalism is a political philosophy which believes that it will produce efficient government and 
improve the economic conditions of the nation through deregulation. It is a transition from pro-
government to pro-private1. Automatically a socio-political conflict arises within the social system. 
Recently, it happened in West Bengal. A transition from socialism to neo-liberalism is realised at 
the beginning of the 21st century and specifically after the West Bengal Assembly elections in 2006. 
Consequently there were manifestations of signs of social resistance.    
This paper attempts to gauge the protest in West Bengal against the backdrop of neo-liberalism, and 
also investigates the formation of preconditions of this shifting paradigm in West Bengal. One of 
the most important preconditions is the erosion of support of the existing left political regime. In 
this context, paper describes the situations, reviews and analyses the evolving popular protest at 
Singur and Nandigram in West Bengal. This analysis is based on Bandyopadhyay (2010), who 
studied the crisis of Left in West Bengal. This paper extends and elaborates it in details.  
West Bengal is one state of the eastern part of India. West Bengal marked a change in its political 
direction since 2006 (Bandyopadhyay (2010)). The events that happened at Nandigram2, or 
involving it, over land acquisition for building a chemical hub, eroded the support3 base of the Left 
Front (LF) government4, which is in power in the state since 1977. The events in Nandigram5 also 
                                                 
1 It suggests that the size of the public sector squeezes while the role of private sector allows rising in the country. 
2 Nandigram is a rural area in the East Medinipur district of West Bengal. Located 70 km south of the state capital 
Kolkata, Nandigram shot into prominence after a stiff resistance by various groups, including the villagers, following 
the state government’s decision to acquire agricultural land for the Salim Group to set up a chemical hub under the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy.  
3 The continuous decline in the support base of the LF, an alliance of the left parties led by the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) -- CPI -M, was manifested first in the Panchayat (three-tier local government structure in the rural areas) 
polls in 2008 (Jana, May, 2008; The Telegraph, May 24, 2008), then in the parliamentary elections (Lok Sabha polls) in 
2009 (Chakarabarti, May, 2009), followed by the civic polls in 2010 (Chakrabarti, June 2010). 
4 For the purpose of this analysis, the connotations like the left, LF, CPI-M and the party would be used 
interchangeably. Although each of these connotations has different domains but this analysis uses them interchangeably 
as the CPI-M is the main constituent of the LF government in West Bengal and it is also India’s most influential left 
party in contemporary electoral politics. 
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highlighted, other land acquisition cases in the state, the other most talked about being at Singur6, 
where the state government had acquired 1000 acres of fertile multi-crop land to facilitate the Tata 
Motors7 setting up a factory to produce ‘Nano’ cars, claimed to be the cheapest in the world 
(Vaswani; Mar, 2009). 
The violence at Nandigram resulted in popular protests, including a huge rally, led by the 
intellectuals in Kolkata on November 14, 2007 (The Telegraph; Nov15, 2007a). The justification 
put forward by the West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya in favour of his party 
cadres (ibid, Nov 14, 2007) and asserting that he was not above his party (ibid, Nov 15, 2007b), 
created even more resentment. Subsequently, many intellectuals, including some ideologically 
inclined to the left, intensified their protests against the path followed by some of their former 
‘comrades’ on industrialisation (Mitra, 2007 b). Even those who were in favour of industrialisation 
in West Bengal openly raised their voice against the actions of the LF government (Dasgupta; Nov, 
2007).  
The main objective of this study is to analyse the shift in development paradigm in West Bengal 
based on ideological change in super structure from socialism to neo liberalism without social base, 
and its consequences on socio-political protest. Just after violence, in Nandigram social protest was 
instantaneous or spontaneous; it added certain weight to the ongoing political protests. This paper 
identifies the origin of protest in the existing political philosophy in West Bengal, and look for the 
reasons behind its manifestation through ways like popular resentment, protest, movements, 
resistance etc. 
The change in the political landscape of West Bengal was also accompanied by a significant shift in 
the support (both moral and physical) that the left enjoyed from the intelligentsia - comprising 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Although Nandigram was marred by violence for a very long period of time ranging over several months,  the two 
incidents which drew maximum public attention were on Mar 14 2007, when police forces marched into the area to 
break the resistance by the local population leading to the death of 14 people in police firing, and  in early November 
2007, when CPI (M) supporters ‘recaptured’ Nandigram, breaking the resistance of those opposing land acquisition by 
‘bloody’ means, resulting in loss of  lives. (The Telegraph, Mar 15, 2007 & Siddiqui, Nov, 2007.) 
6 a cluster of villages in the Hooghly district, 40 kilometres from Kolkata. 
7 a subsidiary of the Tata Group, one of the well known business houses in India. 
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academics, writers, performers and the likes and henceforth referred to as the civil society here -, in 
the state for many decades (Banerjee, 2008a, p: 14).  
In a broad sense, civil society is made up of all sorts of associational groupings which ‘inhabits’ the 
area between the individuals (or families) and the state (Blair 1997; p: 24). The intellectuals (or 
intelligentsia) that have been referred to as the civil society in the case of West Bengal are also part 
of these associational groupings. However, ideologically they are not supporters of the ‘bourgeois 
society’ that Hegel and Marx envisaged the civil society to be. From that point of view, the 
intelligentsia of West Bengal do not comprise the ‘restrictive’ domain of civil society, which 
existed before the 18th century. However, following the changes that the definition of civil society 
has undergone, the domain of such a grouping, in countries like India, could be ‘restricted to a small 
section of culturally (also intellectually) equipped citizens’. (Chatterjee; 2004; p: 41). Due to land 
acquisition event, one might be tempted to think that the movement of the intellectuals away from 
the left could have a role in the decline in the CPI-M’s electoral fortune. The poll results and their 
timing could be a pointer in that direction. The shifting away of a section of the intelligentsia and 
the subsequent electoral reverses are manifestations of the problems faced by the left in West 
Bengal but the crisis was much deep-rooted. 
Despite the hegemonic presence of the left in the terrain of urban politics, rifts emerged among the 
intellectuals. This could be indicative of the tension within the left. Those intellectuals who were 
ideologically committed to the left protested against the neo-liberal path of development followed 
by the CPI-M. For them it was nothing sort of ‘moral betrayal’ of what the LF stood for (Banerjee, 
2007 pp: 1240- 1241). Some of them even alleged that the CPI-M was now more inclined to look 
after the interests of the ‘capitalists’. Acceptance, by the LF government, of the primary role of the 
private sector in development in an age of globalisation, with government playing a secondary role, 
pushed the ideological left even further away from the CPI-M (Mitra, 2007a). However, the new 
breed of intellectuals and professionals, which chose to maintain their proximity with the party for 
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enhancing their career interests, defended the policy of land acquisition for industrialisation8, 
despite the plight of the poor people (Banerjee, 2010; p: 20). This led to a war of words between 
those who supported the version of ‘leftism’ as propagated by the CPI-M and those who opposed it 
but whose left credentials are beyond doubt. This resulted in alienation of a section leading to 
vertical division within the intelligentsia (Datta Gupta, 2009). Some of the intellectuals even 
decided to go with the main opposition party, the Trina Mool Cogress (TMC). For many 
intellectuals, who were erstwhile supporters of the LF, TMC chief Mamata Banerjee, through her 
protests at Singur and Nandigram has done what was expected of the traditional left. For others, 
Miss Banerjee was the rallying point of those who are opposed to the official left, i.e. the CPI-M 
(Sharma, 2010).  
The threats faced by the rural population raised moral questions against the policy adopted by the 
LF (Hughes, 2007). Some even questioned the democratic credentials of the CPI-M, which once 
took radical measures to democratise the rural power structure. 
 
The plan for this article is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on neo-liberalism. Section 3 
describes the Left Paradox in West Bengal. Section 4 presents and analyses the protests in West 
Bengal. Section 5 provides a theoretical analysis and finally section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Literature Review on Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism is a revival of liberalism. Neo-liberalism emerged as an ideological response to the 
crisis of the Keynesian welfare state. After the end of the World War II (WWII) the world rejected 
the laissez faire doctrine. During the following quarter-century or so, a variety of interventionist 
                                                 
8 Land acquisition for private industries was not something which started in West Bengal with Singur and Nandigram. 
Even before the LF government announced its New Industrial Policy over 200 acres were land were acquired in 
Kharagpur for the pig-iron factories of the Tatas and the Birlas. The acquisition of agricultural land and the 
compensation offered in lieu of that created resentment among the affected population, leading to protests by some 
political parties locally. However, such protests didn’t impact in the same way as the events at Nandigram and Singur 
did (Guha, 2007, pp: 3706- 3711). One could thus argue that the participation of the intellectuals in protest rallies added 
a greater momentum to the movement against land acquisition. 
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economic theories, such as welfare economics, Keynesianism and the early development 
economics, set the agenda for the debate on the role of the state (Chang and Rowthorn, 1995a; also 
see Deane, 1989). These interventionist theories identified several market failures and argued that 
active state involvement was necessary to correct these failures. There were marked changes in the 
terms of debate on the role of the state (Marglin and Schor, 1990). The new terms of debate were 
set by neoliberal economists like Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, George Stigler, James 
Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Anne Krueger, Ian Little and Alan Peacock (for critical reviews, see 
Mueller, 1979; Cullis and Jones, 1987; Chang, 1994a; and Stretton and Orchard, 1994). Neo-
liberalism emerged out of an unholy alliance between neoclassical economics (mostly provides 
analytical tools) and Austrarian-libertarian tradition (provides political and moral philosophy).  
The main argument regarding state intervention is that we cannot assume the state to be an impartial 
and omnipotent social guardian as it is assumed in capitalism or market economy. We observe the 
state as an economic agent run the organisation by self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats, who are 
not only limited in their ability to collect information and execute policies, but are also under 
pressures from interest groups. Neo-liberal economists argue that this imperfect nature of the state 
results in government failures. As a result there are regulatory capture, rent seeking, corruptions and 
so on. Neo-liberal economists argue that the costs of these government failures are typically greater 
than the costs of market failures. Logically, it is better for the state not to try to correct market 
failures, because it may make the outcome even worse. In the neo-liberal view of society, the 
market is always opposed to the state: the market is the realm of freedom, whereas the state is the 
realm of power. This power is often not well used by self-serving employees of the state, which is 
seen as always less efficient than the market. 
Simon Clarke presents the neo-liberalism that reasserts the fundamental beliefs of the liberal political 
economy which was based on intuition and assertion rather than rigorous analysis. The ideological 
appeal of liberalism demands for ‘social reform’ precipitated by the rise of the organised working class 
and a growing awareness of the ‘social problems’. The liberal model of society remained the ideal, but it 
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was recognised that this ideal could not be attained by the power of the market9 alone, which would 
have to be supplemented by the guiding hand of the state. Ha-Joon Chang (2001) critically examines 
the neoliberal discourse that currently informs the dominant view on the role of the state, and 
suggests an alternative theoretical framework, institutional political economy, to overcome its 
limitations. Scholars within the field of comparative political economy remain overwhelmingly 
attached to theoretical approaches that emphasize the mediating role of institutions, insulating 
national political economies from common economic pressures, and that identify a variety of 
features of institutions which encourage stickiness, incrementalism, and path dependence. In 
contrast, practitioners of industrial relations, particularly trade unions, are much more likely to 
identify a vast change in which the balance of power between class forces has shifted toward 
employers, unions have largely been on the defensive and collective institutions and forms of labour 
market regulation have been weakened. Baccaro and Howell (2011) reconcile these two forms of 
knowledge. Neo-liberal transformation manifests itself not just institutional deregulation but also as 
institutional conversion, as the functions associated with existing institutional forms change in a 
convergent direction. Industrial relations systems are being transformed in a common direction, a 
direction that we characterize as neoliberal (Baccaro and Howell 2011). This does not mean that 
industrial relations institutions in each advanced capitalist country are necessarily coming to 
resemble those of an archetypal liberal market economy, though there is certainly movement in that 
direction.   
The conceptual starting point for neoliberal theory is the rational, self-interested individual with 
unique and subjective preferences10. Drawing upon public choice theory, neoliberals argue that 
governments operate according to the individual self-interest of bureaucrats, politicians and lobby 
                                                 
9 The dominant strands of economics no longer rejected demands for social reform on the basis of the 
primacy of the market, but sought instead to identify and delimit the scope of reform by identifying the 
‘market imperfections’ that led the reality of the market economy to fall short of the liberal ideal. 
10 It is constructed an economic defence of free markets. Neoliberals argue that markets, when freed from external 
‘interferences’, most notably in the form of the state, are the most moral and the most efficient means for producing and 
distributing goods and services. Neoliberal theory holds that a market-led economy is better than a government-led 
economy in terms of development in general (Lubliner 2006). It means that markets can distribute capital, goods, and 
services, more efficiently throughout the world than governments can. The welfare state in contrast, according to the 
neoliberals, tends to privilege ‘special interests’. 
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groups and that welfare payments of all types simply serve these interests of bureaucrats, politicians 
and lobby groups. Welfare bureaucrats and lobby groups have an interest in maintaining levels of 
disadvantage in order to justify their own existence. For the neoliberals, government agencies are 
not subject to the neutral pricing mechanisms and discipline of market forces. The monopolistic 
provision of government services tends to 'crowd out' initiatives from the private sector. 
Government regulation of markets creates 'distortions', thus creating inefficiencies, and the political 
considerations involved in formulating such regulations means that governments are, in effect, 
'picking winners' by favouring certain industries rather than allowing markets to produce optimal 
outcomes. The regulations inevitably infringe individual liberty. Neoliberal truly advocates a radical 
dismantling of the state: the transfer of the provision of goods and services from the public to the 
private sector.  
Government and markets are interconnected in four ways: (i) they represent the two dominant ways 
to distribute goods and services, (ii) public power is necessary to create free markets, (iii) 
governmental authority is required to address and regulate market failures, and (iv) the government 
intervention may be necessary to provide public infrastructure investment or insure profitability of 
private businesses. Neo-liberalism is a political economic theory committed to the laissez-faire 
market fundamentalism ideology that includes a belief in comparative advantage, a minimalist state 
and market freedom11. If neo-liberalism includes a commitment to market fundamentalism then that 
also means that it is decided to a politics of limited government. This includes privatization, 
deregulation and a scaling back of many traditional functions that capitalist and communist states 
had performed since WWII. Attitudes towards neo-liberalism can be divided into four categories 
(Gosme 2002): those who support it because (i) it clearly benefits them; (ii) they genuinely believe 
                                                 
11 Neo-liberalism theory transcends the state and provides an international economic theory committed to free trade and 
globalism. Steger describes globalization as a social or material process referring to a form of a means of production. 
Globalism is the dominant political ideology of the day that serves neo-liberal interests. According to Steger 
globalisation is presented as a inescapable process, going in one precise direction: a world market where investors are 
all-powerful, and where the role of the state is reduced to providing basic infrastructure as well as law and order. Such 
an idea of globalisation is violently rejected by many, who define themselves as anti-globalisation. Most people 
involved in the anti-globalisation movement are against the neoliberal ideology. 
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that a neo-liberal political and economic system is the best way to bring about prosperity and 
happiness to the people; (iii) enthusiastic about it but cannot see any alternative; and (iv) those who 
resolutely oppose it.  
A neo-liberal state commits to cut regulation or make them more business friendly and encourage 
private capital accumulation. The anti-capitalist movements and pro-poor government were active 
in West Bengal since 1970s. People of West Bengal oppose the process of neo-liberalism or 
privatisation even in the 21st century. The socio-political protests were organised against the 
agricultural land acquisition for private sector in 2006. The state government of West Bengal 
facilitated the controversy by using 1894 land acquisition act rule to conduct a takeover of 997 acres 
(4.03 km2) of farmland to have Tata Motors build its factory. The rule is meant for public 
improvement projects, and the West Bengal government wanted Tata to build in its state. The 
project was opposed by activists and opposition parties in Bengal. The critics of the government's 
industrialization policy have argued on the other hand that while India is moving towards a "free 
market" economy, government has been acting as a broker for the private sector by forcing private 
citizens to give up their property at throw away prices. It seems that neo-liberalism ideology starts 
to prevail in West Bengal and people oppose it. 
3. Left Paradox in West Bengal  
The protest against the acquisition of agricultural land for industrialisation in West Bengal might in 
itself imply a challenge to the authority of the CPI-M following its departure from the ideological 
standpoint of being a pro-poor party to the one that is embracing neo-liberalism. However, we 
would argue that the protests transcend beyond the physical space they occupy at a point in time 
and are indicative of a much deep-rooted tension emanating from over three decades of left rule in 
the state.  
This, one could argue, is not only the fallout of the ‘mistakes’ committed by the left but also the 
outcome of the policies that they followed over the past years. The CPI-M’s eagerness to invite 
 10 
private capital in West Bengal might be an admission of the fact that within the structure of a 
liberalised Indian economy, it is not possible for a state to embark on a diametrically different 
economic policy. However, we would argue that the immediate intention behind the paradigm shift 
in the development model followed by the LF was to stave off the crisis that they thought could 
threaten their long held authority in the political domain.  
The land reform carried out by the LF has resulted in the dramatic reduction in the number of 
owners of large holdings thereby impeding rural capital formation. The implementation of the 
Panchayat system, to ensure decentralisation of rural governance, led to the emergence of a new 
class, whose power was not entirely based on land holdings (Sanyal, 2008). The aspiration of the 
constituents of this new class increased with their rise in the political hierarchy. The relative 
importance of agriculture as a source of income depleted resulting in the increased demand for 
industrial jobs, which, however, was not immediately available as the LF over the past decades have 
‘neglected’ industrialisation in its bid to hold on to rural support base.  
All these have contributed to a crisis and I would argue that the post-2006 LF government had taken 
recourse to neo-liberalism only to overcome it (this crisis). From that standpoint one could argue 
that the protests against land acquisition are in a way manifestation of the failures or the weaknesses 
of the damage control exercise that the LF embarked on. An aspect of this paper would be to find 
out as to why the LF failed despite being in power for decades with such thumping majority. 
However, a clear understanding of the crisis is possible only if we take a look at how the LF 
consolidated its power and held on to it for such a long time.  
3.1 Rural Focus  
Ever since the LF assumed power in 1977, their focus was predominantly on the rural sector. Like 
in other parts of India, West Bengal is also a predominantly rural society and according to many the 
‘key’ to the left’s electoral success, was mainly because of its ‘rural popularity’, (Bhattacharya, 
2010; p: 51), which is the result of land reform, decentralisation of the rural power structure etc. 
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The land reforms, carried out in the state within the first few years of the LF assuming power, not 
only eliminated the dominance of the landed class from the rural society but also ensured the 
emergence of new beneficiaries in the villages. These beneficiaries, comprising mostly of the ‘rural 
proletariat’, were offered small plots of land and in turn they ensured that the interests of the party 
were served. The rights of the sharecroppers or bargadars, who cultivated bulk of the land, were 
also legalised, as a matter of priority, through ‘operation barga’ (the movement to register the 
names of the sharecroppers). (Guha, 2008; p: 529-530) 
The landed class, mostly comprising of absentee landlords, were considered to be supporters of the 
Congress as these groups had benefited to some extent from the actions of the party (Congress),  
(Kohli, 1990; p: 273) - the main opposition party of the LF then. The elimination of the landed class 
from the rural power structure provided the CPI-M with a freehand in the countryside 
(Bhattacharya, 2010, pp: 52-54)12.  
This social phenomenon provides an interesting insight in understanding the domination of the CPI-
M in the political landscape of West Bengal for such a long time, which is unprecedented in the 
electoral history of India. This was made possible as the CPI-M created a system of ‘Clientelism’ 
(Chatterjee, 2009; p: 42) and dished out favour to those who supported the party. The ‘institutional 
effectiveness of the local government structure’ (panchayat system) and the control that the party 
enjoyed over those helped the CPI-M in ensuring legitimacy of their actions (ibid, pp: 44-45).  
Following its rural supremacy a new brand of local political leaders emerged in the countryside, 
who were more inclined in maintaining the physical and electoral domination (of the party), through 
fear and favour, rather than being ideologically committed to the party.  A similar class of 
beneficiaries also emerged in the urban and semi-urban areas. They played important roles like, 
distributing seeds, and fertilisers etc. in the countryside, mitigating disputes (ibid, p: 43) and often 
                                                 
12 Bhattacharya (2010) formulates the concept of ‘party society’ the constituents of which are either heavily dependent 
or largely benefited by the actions of the party and its machinery. The author feels that the creation of the party society 
played a significant role in consolidating left power in West Bengal and is unique compared to many other states in 
India, where social elements like caste, creed and religion are more pronounced as compared to the societal framework 
prevalent in West Bengal. 
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providing security in both the urban and the rural terrain. Absence of a strong opposition for many 
decades ensured the consolidation of the party and for many people it became a way of life. Thus 
the old power structure of rural Bengal was replaced by a new one where party supremacy replaced 
the social and economic domination of the landed class. The ‘institutionalisation’ of the party 
within the system of governance as well as in the social and economic structure was thought to be 
the main reasons behind the stability that prevailed in West Bengal for a long time under the left 
rule. (Williams, 2001, p: 605). 
 
3.2 Instability in the Realm of Party Domination: 
The domination of the party, which was initially evident in the rural and then in the urban areas, 
faced instability for a multiplicity of reasons one being the rising aspirations of a section of the 
society (the new emergent class of leaders), who were beneficiaries of the uninterrupted left rule.13 
These elements of the rural society who yielded power and position because of their proximity to 
the party now wanted to move further up the social and economic ladder14. However, there was no 
provision to fulfil this aspiration within the social and the economic structures that the party created.  
I would argue that the objective of the party was short-term political gain rather than long term 
economic development. If the intention of the party was to ensure long term development the 
natural way would have been to use the agricultural surplus for industrialisation. However, that 
didn’t happen and the large scale fragmentation of land even denied the benefits of economies of 
scale. The absence of the landed class in the rural economy was detrimental to necessary capital 
formation.  
In the rural arena the instability was also manifested by marginalisation of the peasantry although 
the objective of the land reform was to halt such de-peasantisation. Census figures available from 
                                                 
13 I owe this argument to a personal interaction with Abhirup Sarkar of the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata.  
Dated: Au g 23 2010. 
14 The agrarian success in the initial years of the LF rule led to creation of profitable businesses, like cold storage, rice 
mills etc., which were not directly linked to the land but to the rural sector. Those because of their proximity to the party 
managed to do well in these areas now aspired to move to new terrains of economic profitability. 
 
 13 
and the Statistical Handbook 2004, West Bengal, BAES, government of West Bengal (and quoted 
in Banerjee & Roy, 2007, p: 2048) show that the number of owner-cultivators in the state decreased 
during the period 1991-2001 (from 64.07 lakhs in 1991 to 56.54 lakhs in 2001), while the number 
of agricultural labourers increased (from 54.81 lakhs in 1991 to 73.63 lakhs in 2001) by a 
significant proportion.  
The owners of small holdings were forced to part with their land -- as farming in such holdings 
were no longer economical -- and work either as sharecroppers or agricultural labourers.  This 
shows that although land reform was showcased as a thumping political success by the LF, it did 
not necessarily bring about the economic benefits to those for whom it was targeted.  
Negation of democratic values despite having an elected rural government structure was also 
another reason behind the instability within the realms of the domination of the party. 
Decentralisation of rural power may have been the motive behind the introduction of the Panchayat 
system but party domination resulted in its concentration only with those who were close to the 
CPI-M,  thereby depriving the poor from occupying positions of leadership (Bhattacharya, 2010, 
p:56).  Thus the decentralisation of rural power in West Bengal came to be seen as ‘based on an 
unstable mixture of idealism and opportunism’ (Guha; 2008, pp 670-71) 
Following rapid commercialisation of the agricultural sector and the withdrawal of subsidies from 
the agricultural inputs under pressure from neo-liberal globalisation, the contribution of agriculture 
to family income decreased (Bhattacharya, 2010; p: 52). This was also another source of instability 
within the rural sector. There was a demand for new support structure to help those who were not 
attracted to the agricultural sector for employment.  The dearth in job creation in the absence of 
adequate speed of industrialisation also resulted in instability in both the rural and urban areas. 
 
3.3 Embracing Neo-Liberalism: 
Faced with such instability in its support base, the LF, one could argue, took recourse to a path of 
economic growth by competing with other states of India in attracting private capital. I would argue 
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that this was imperative as the state lacked in adequate capital formation necessary to set up 
industries. The continuous disregard by the LF of the need for industrialisation in the three decades 
of its rule also contributed to this factor.  
I would argue that as a ‘class-based’ social movement party (Heller, 2005; p: 81) the CPI-M tried 
dealing with this instability by reproducing another wave of social movement, as it did in its initial 
years after assuming power and driving out the landed class from the rural areas. This time the wave 
of social movement was branded in favour of industrialisation and the thumping victory of the party 
in 2006 assembly polls was portrayed as a popular mandate in that direction (Chattopadhyay, 2007).  
The left leadership in the state argued (ibid & Chattopadhyay, 2006) that land reform was not an 
end in itself and industrialisation was necessary for moving into the next phase of development.  
Thus the path of industrialisation followed by the LF was based on the principle of neo-liberal 
capitalism, which accepts the dominance of capital over other factors of production and the state 
government also provided the necessary support to ensure the supremacy of capital, by dishing out 
huge benefits to keep the capitalists in good stead (Mitra; 2007a). This is somewhat paradoxical as 
ideologically, the LF and the CPI (M) are opposed to unfettered liberalisation and also to the 
formation of SEZ (Mukherjee, 2006). However, the apparent opposition of the party to economic 
liberalisation was in contradiction to what the state Chief Minister Mr Bhattacharya had reiterated, 
that globalisation is now a fact of life and one should try and reap its benefits (Mazumdar, 2005).  
This trajectory of development also marked a significant shift in the way the CPI-M maintained its 
domination. The model followed by the CPI-M for many years was that of ‘patron–client 
relationship’ which was maintained by offering small favours in lieu of votes. Since 2006, the party 
under the leadership of Buddhadeb Bhattacharya switched to the model of ‘elite capture’. One could 
argue that the new model might have emanated from the increased aspiration of the CPI-M from 
being a party of the proletariat to one representing the ever expanding middle class. This can be 
construed as being urban-biased resulting in a void in support structure of the party in the rural 
areas, which has so far been its bastion.  
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4. Protest in West Bengal 
The move by the seventh LF government (2006) to acquire agricultural land for industrialisation 
faced protests right from the beginning. It started with Singur, where the local people, comprising 
medium and marginal farmers, sharecroppers and the agricultural labourers, led the resistance. Such 
protests reached its peak with the events in Nandigram, where the villagers resisted the state 
machinery, including the police, from entering that area for a long time.  
As an electoral constituency, Singur has been under the control of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) – 
the main opposition party in the state – and hence it is difficult to standardise the protest there as a 
case of resistance against the LF primarily by those who once constituted their support base in the 
rural sector. However, Nandigram, which had been under the electoral control of the LF 
(Communist Party of India or CPI a constituent of the LF) for a very long time, can be portrayed as 
a prototype of popular protest against the move by the LF government.  
The reasons behind the popular protest against land acquisition by the LF government for 
industrialisation are manifold. However, they underline the paradox that lies in the LF toeing a neo-
liberal path of growth leaving out a large section of the population, which once constituted their 
core support group, outside the ambit of development. It also underlined the short-sightedness of the 
LF leadership and its inability to take the state to the next phase of development, despite long tenure 
in power.   
 
4.1 Reversal of Rural Reforms: 
Opposition to land acquisition for industrialisation could be viewed as a backlash emanating from 
the dichotomy between what the CPI-M as a political party had once professed (Banerjee & Roy, 
2007; p: 2048) and their actions now. The extensive land reforms, which the left showcases as its 
resounding success in West Bengal, were virtually ‘negated’ by the way land acquisition was 
carried out for industrialisation.   
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Three decades ago, the left consolidated power by redistributing agricultural land taken away from 
the landed class. Following their focus on industrialisation, the LF government was now taking 
back the same land that they had given to the ‘rural proletariat’ and handing it over to corporate 
capitalists with huge concessions. This was also seen as an attempt to ‘pauperise’ those who once 
supported the left wholeheartedly and helped it to retain power (Gangopadhyay; 2006). 
This argument finds support in the compensation package offered to the agricultural labourers and 
unregistered bargadars or sharecroppers. These two groups are to lose their livelihoods in case the 
land they cultivated was to be acquired for industrial projects. The sharecroppers were offered one 
quarter of the land value as compensation, despite the fact that they produced three quarters of the 
crops. This is in sharp contrast to what was on offer for the landowners, mostly non-cultivating 
absentee landlords, who were given 30 per cent more than their land value (Banerjee & Roy, 2007; 
p: 2048). Given the large number of sharecroppers and agricultural labourers, the LF faced 
mounting opposition to its mission of industrialisation (Chandra, 2008; p: 49). 
The rehabilitation schemes which were offered in the form of training and apprenticeships etc. were 
also inadequate given the number of people involved. Added to this is the fact that the 
sharecroppers and landless agricultural labourers, who have been involved in farming for 
generations, would find it very difficult to adapt to such changes (Sau, 2008; p: 11). 
Decentralisation of the rural power structure, which was made possible by the LF through 
implementation of the Panchayati Raj system, was also called for question in the drive for 
industrialisation. Through the local government structure in the rural areas a democratic set up was 
formulated whereby the people living in the villages would have their say on the way they live and 
also on their livelihood. This system may have several shortcomings; the least because of the 
domination of the party in the rural domain, but one cannot deny the fact that it created an 
atmosphere of self-governance. However, that was ‘negated’ by the way industrialisation was meant 
to be carried out. The local people had no say in the land acquisition process as well as in the 
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compensation and the rehabilitation packages (Bhattacharya, 2007a).  The whole thing was decided 
at the highest level of the LF government and the party.  
The CPI-M leadership in West Bengal totally overlooked its rural constituency in its attempt to 
‘rationalise (neo liberal) capitalism’ (Banerjee, 2008b; p: 15). The state industry minister Nirupam 
Sen even justified their stance stating that in a market economy the wishes of the investor were 
supreme (Pathak, 2006). This highlighted the paradox between the party’s ideology and what it 
practised. One could argue that this paradox depleted the party of its moral authority to act as a 
custodian of the rural community, which provided it necessary support to remain in power.  
 
4.2 Lack of Dignified Livelihood  
Another reason behind the popular protest against the land acquisition in West Bengal could be the 
fallout of what some would refer to as the ‘lack of dignified livelihood’ of those who are at the 
receiving end of industrialisation. (Bhaduri, 2009, pp: 79-80). The decisions of industrialisation 
were taken without nay consultation even with those who would be affected most. Taking 
advantage of  being in power for over three decades, the CPI-M leadership considered themselves 
as the custodians of the people in the state and this was often seen as ‘arrogance’ by the same 
people who once supported the party. The general perception among the rural community, 
especially the poor and the marginalised, was that the drive for industrialisation was mainly directed 
towards the rich and the middle class.   
The CPI-M leadership totally ignored the fact that meaningful engagement with the people was 
necessary for the successful implementation of any policy. In some cases people were forced to 
accept whatever was decided by either party officials or those who represented the LF at the 
Panchayats (Bhattacharya, 2007b). Although, the Chief Minister admitted that such a 
communication gap was a ‘mistake’ (Chattopadhyay, 2007) yet such decision-making remained 
within the domain of the elite, the middle class policymakers and the media commentators 
(Bhaduri, 2009; p: 79).  
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Such an attitude of those at the helm inflicted a sense of insult among the rural community, 
especially those who owned small plots of land. For the farmers, who take great pride in cultivation 
for generations and have been immensely benefited by way of employment and income, now found 
themselves in a precarious situation of being forced to do menial jobs to facilitate better lives for the 
urban middle class. The price being offered for land cannot be any substitute to the sense of family 
security and social esteem that it (land) provides to the farming class (Sau, 2008, p: 11). 
 This insult found its way out in different elections, despite the CPI-M having strong machinery to 
mobilise supporters. In fact, those people who have once mobilised support for the party, now were 
antagonised as the moral political economy which prevailed in the rural areas - that the CPI-M 
would look after the poor - was tarnished and this was also reflected in some of the urban and semi-
urban constituencies, dominated by the ‘proletariats’ (Sanyal, 2009). 
4.3 Jobless Growth 
It is a well-known fact that market-oriented plan for economic progress based on neo-liberalism and 
coupled with technological development has resulted in growth which is not necessarily equitable 
(Shrivastava, 2007). To make economic progress sustainable it needs to be made equitable, which 
can only be ensured if the benefits of growth trickle down to the lowest economic strata. The way to 
make this happen is through creation of jobs. However, technological development coupled with the 
enhanced profit motive of capital has resulted in jobless growth, i.e. creation of only fewer jobs. 
While Tata Steel, a company of the Tata Group, increased its annual production five times between 
1991and 2005, it nearly halved its workforce during the said period (Bhaduri, 2009; p: 139).  This 
resulted in concentration of wealth only among a few, which only increases disparity leading to 
socio-economic destabilisation. The destabilising effect can only be appropriated by redistributing a 
fraction of the income accrued by those benefited through creation of jobs to those who have been 
displaced and dispossessed by land acquisition. 
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This trend, also evident in West Bengal15, created a sense of suspicion among a large section of the 
population resulting in popular protests both in the rural and the urban areas.  A large section of the 
people felt left out from the development process and this only re-emphasised the fact that although 
the LF ideologically believes in class struggle leading to the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, the 
path it embarked on upheld the ‘politics of exclusion’ (Sanyal, 2008).  
 
4.4 Myopic Vision of Development  
Another reason behind the popular unrest stems from the ‘short-sightedness’ of the LF leaders about 
development in general and industrialisation in particular.16 One could argue that the instability and 
decline in popular support following its drive for industrialisation is the price that the party is 
paying for neglecting the long-term objective of development.   
The LF then should have taken the initiative of setting up agricultural cooperatives, local agro-
based industries and technical institutes in the countryside immediately after the land reforms 
programme in the 1970s. Such a move could have trained and accommodated the youth or children 
of the first generation of beneficiaries of land reforms ‘under a programme of self-reliant advanced 
socio-economic changes’.  
After having ignored this new generation of unemployed rural youth for over three decades now, 
the LF government, in order to contain a growing dissatisfaction, has now fallen for the readily 
available option – industrial projects and the SEZs ‘offered by the corporate magnates, which are 
being palmed off by the CPI-M ministers as the industrial utopia where the rural youth would find 
jobs’.  
This is being done ignoring the fact that these young people, kept untrained in any skills all these 
years by an ‘uncaring’ LF government, can never be employed in these industrial enterprises, which 
                                                 
15 According to Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Government of India, and quoted from the Statistical Handbook, 
West Bengal, 2004, (published by BAES, Government of West Bengal), by Banerjee & Roy (2007), the number of 
industries in West Bengal increased from 5.606 to 6,195 during the period 1990-2001-02. The investment for the 
corresponding period increased from R 12,517.67 crore to Rs 32,752.98 crore, whereas the number of employees in 
these industries declined from 740,980 to 545,447.  
16 I owe this argument to a personal interaction with Sumanta Banerjee (email, dated: July 2, 2010) 
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need highly skilled personnel. This sense of neglect also contributed to the popular protest against 
the CPI-M. 
As is being evident from the analysis so far, the LF front, wants to set up industries for creation of 
jobs but not for the people who formed the core of its support base both in the rural and urban areas. 
Instead, it wanted to invite private capital to attract the middle class. The emergent middle class are 
non-ideological and result-oriented (Das, 2002, p: 285). I would argue that like this emergent class, 
the CPI-M now wants to free itself from the shackles of ideology, which was once thrust upon the 
people by the party. This antagonism between the ideology and the practice is resulting in conflict, 
which is being manifested by popular protests. 
4.5 Protests by Civil Society 
The popular protest that erupted in West Bengal following the move for land acquisition for setting 
up industries reached a culmination with the intellectuals taking to the streets against the actions of 
the CPI-M cadres, who carried out raids at Nandigram to drive out their political opponents. As I 
have stated in the introduction, a huge rally was organised in Kolkata on November 14, 2007, which 
was attended by intellectuals ideologically and politically supportive of the CPI-M for decades. The 
intellectuals protested against the high-handedness of the CPI-M, ignoring the wishes of the people 
of Nandigram.  
This rally and the subsequent events portrayed the shift in the positions of a large section of the civil 
society (intellectuals) in the state. I have argued that this shift in the positions is the manifestation of 
a crisis engulfing the left in West Bengal. In the earlier chapters I have tried to identify the crisis, 
find out the reasons behind it and analyse the subsequent protests that followed.  My endeavour 
now would be to illustrate the impact of the action of the intellectuals. However, to begin with one 
needs to assess the nature of the intellectuals in West Bengal. 
Traditionally, the Bengali intellectuals have been politically very conscious and many of them have 
even been part of the politico-cultural movements in India. As the history of Indian independence 
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would show, Bengal (undivided then) developed a regional intelligentsia prior to the formation of 
the Congress Party or the arrival of Gandhi in the political stage. This elite class mobilized Bengali 
nationalism but didn’t fully integrate into the larger movement for Indian independence (Kohli, 
1990, pp: 270-271), thus preferring to maintain a distinct identity. 
Historically, Congress never had a strong foothold in Bengal and a large section of the Bengali elite 
overlooked the party to try radical nationalism and militant politics (ibid). Even within the Congress 
many of the radical elements were from undivided Bengal and influenced by the Communist 
ideology. One could take this as a pointer to the support that the left ideology enjoyed among the 
Bengalis.  
This was enhanced following independence as many Bengalis blame the Congress for the partition 
in 1947 and the resultant displacement of people. The elites of Kolkata (mostly Hindus), who lost 
their landed properties following partition were antagonised against the Congress. They were joined 
by the hundreds of Hindu refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan, who didn’t have any access to land 
but were educated and socially conscious (Ray, 1999; p: 50). This tilted the intellectuals and the 
educated middle class further against the Congress. It helped the left parties to consolidate support 
among the Bengali population.  The identity of Kolkata as a radical and anti-imperialist city was 
also well known (Guha 2008; p: 163) this along with its anti-establishment and oppositional nature 
(Ray, 1999, p: 55) matched with the general ideology of the left.  
The effect of all this was the creation of an anti-Congress environment, especially in and around 
Kolkata, where most of the refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan had settled. With the city and its 
people the Bengali intellectuals, including artists, academics, foreign-educated barristers, were 
attracted by the left ideology resulting in their proximity first with the CPI and later with the CPI-
M. This proximity continued for long and with the Congress still the dominant political force in 
India then, the backing of the intelligentsia provided the left with the necessary moral and cultural 
support. This even contributed to the LF attaining power in the 1977 elections.  
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4.5.1 Intellectuals and Clientelism: 
According to Antonio Gramsci, the domain of the civil society is ‘not directly part of the state’ 
(Forgacs 2000; p: 420). However, in West Bengal the intelligentsia was linked (ideologically, 
morally and in some cases physically) to the CPI (M) even after it assumed power in the state.  One 
can see this proximity as an outcome of  some of the  ‘progressive steps’ taken by the government, 
i.e. land reform, the introduction of the local government structure in the rural areas etc. Many 
intellectuals also backed the LF because of pure ideological reasons, as anti-Congressism was then 
the order of the day for the radicals and those who were anti-establishment. The CPI-M benefited 
from its proximity with the intellectuals as the Bengali middle class was influenced by the actions 
of the intelligentsia.  
As the party remained in power for decades, a ‘patron-client’ relationship developed between the 
CPI-M and the intelligentsia, with those close to the left nominated to intellectual positions of 
prestige and fame, especially in areas like education (Mukhopadhyay, 2007). Formation of such a 
symbiotic relation between the party and the intelligentsia and the absence of a viable opposition in 
the state resulted in the emergence of a new brand of intellectuals. Majority of this new breed of 
intellectuals, including actors, academics etc, were not ideologically committed to the party but 
wanted to use their connection with the people in power for career interests (Banerjee, 2010, P: 20). 
The patron-client relationship became more intense as the party used these intellectuals, many of 
whom were professional celebrities without ideological inclination, for beefing up popular support 
in its favour especially following the crisis in the left.  
Many observers are of the view that the ‘partisan’ attitudes taken by the LF in areas like culture, 
education etc. created a class who favoured status quo as they were direct beneficiaries of the left 
rule. This was also replicated in the rural areas where primary school teachers emerged as the elite 
and were used to boost popular support for the party in the rural areas (Bhattacharya, 2010, p: 55).  
The CPI-M, which used fear and favour to ensure its political domination in the rural areas, also 
resorted to the same tactics, albeit with lot more sophistication, in the urban political domain.   
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4.5.2 Hegemony in Urban Politics: 
The influence of the CPI-M in the urban political terrain was so intense that Kolkata’s political field 
was considered to be ‘hegemonic’ (Ray, 1999; p: 11)17 . This implies that in Kolkata there was very 
little space for others or ‘sub-ordinate’ elements to establish themselves and survive. The CPI-M 
utilised its hegemonic presence to control various elements within the urban society.  
The nature of Kolkata’s political field  also contributed to this end as it was marked by the 
predominance of party politics (ibid, p: 52) and hence non-party political formations as well as 
autonomous interest groups were not left with much space in the city. This resulted in the 
organisation of various groups under the umbrella of political parties. Such frontal organisations 
also helped in the expansion of the domain of influence of the CPI-M. 
 With the presence of the CPI-M as the hegemonic political force in the urban space and the absence 
of non-party political formations, the new breed of intellectuals had no choice but to maintain their 
proximity to the party for favours to flourish in their respective fields. I would argue that this could 
be the reason as to why this breed of intellectuals maintained their proximity with the party (and 
also the state under the CPI-M), though it’s in contradiction with the Gramscian definition of civil 
society.   
4.5.3 Civil Society and Political Society:    
The support of the intellectuals to the cause of the rural poor in West Bengal raises an important 
point at the theoretical level i.e. the coming together of the civil society and the political society.  
Partha Chatterjee has described ‘civil society’ as an associational form of the citizens (individuals) 
originating from Western modernity and based on many things including equality and autonomy 
(Chatterjee; 2002, p: 172).  He has also formulated the concept of ‘political society’, which 
represents a domain devoid of citizenship rights. The constituents of the political society demand 
                                                 
17 Making a comparative analysis of the women’s movements in Kolkata and Mumbai , Ray argues that the political 
culture in the former was more homogenous compared to the  later and this represented a concentration in the 
distribution of power. (p:20) 
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(or are dependent on) collective rights based on state welfare and are served through ‘mediations’ 
(ibid, p: 172-173). Chatterjee relates the formation of civil society to Western modernity, while the 
political society to post-colonial democracy.  
One could argue that there is a potential for conflict between the civil and political societies as the 
former is based on individualism while the later represents majority or identity-based politics.18 
This tension generally keeps the constituents of the two domains apart. However, in the case of 
protest against land acquisition there was tremendous outpouring of support for the constituents of 
the political society from those who comprise the civil society. One could even argue that the 
support of the civil society has provided the moral legitimacy to the demands raised by the political 
society.  
A possible explanation behind the coming together of the civil and political societies can be 
deduced to the position that the two domains occupy. Those who are part of the political society in 
this case operate mostly in the rural or semi-urban domain as against the intellectuals (civil society), 
who are pre-dominantly city-based. The difference in their spatial domain may have contributed in 
avoiding a potential tension that exists between the political and civil societies.19 This, however, can 
in no way be the reason to overlook the moral position that the intellectuals might have taken by 
protesting against the loss of livelihood of the poor people at the cost of benefits provided by the 
state to further the interests of private capital. 
5. Analysing the Protest in the Theoretical Framework 
Why the LF government, which adopted its New Industrial Policy in 1994, went overboard with its 
drive for industrialisation after 2006 and the reasons behind the popular unrest that followed, is a 
matter for intense political and economic debate. So far we have tried to analyse this based on 
empirical evidence. In this chapter we will try to map a theoretical imagery analysing why such 
                                                 
18 The landless labourers and the sharecroppers, who constitute the majority of the affected people in the land 
acquisition case, can hardly operate at the individual level because of the socio-economic and intellectual position they 
occupy in the society. However, as the agitation at Nandigram and Singur has shown they can collectively pose strong 
resistance even against the organised the state machinery. 
19 The idea behind such an analysis emerged following a personal interaction with Kalyan Sanyal, in August 2010. 
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unrest followed, despite the LF being in power for almost over three decades.20 However, given the 
complexity of the situation put forward by the stream of events at Singur and Nandigram it is 
difficult to posit the analysis within the parameters of a specific theoretical framework.  
5.1 Crisis of ‘Hegemony’:  
The Gramscian analysis of hegemony has gained prominence in the analysis of the crisis that the LF 
faces in West Bengal. The events that led to the decline of the left in the state ‘happened in a 
manner that classically matches the crisis in hegemony in the Gramscian sense21 -- ‘when overnight 
hundreds and thousands of people move away from the party that once represented them’. 
 Such a crisis, in the authority of the ruling class, happens when they loose the consent of the 
masses or when there is a mobilisation of the subordinate class (or classes) against the dominant 
class. According to Gramsci, such a crisis manifests itself when party representatives (the dominant 
or the ruling class) become detached from the social classes and this often opens the way for ‘all 
kinds of demagogues and adventurers to come forth and cash in on the discontent’.  The ruling class 
then attempts to reassert its control by quelling any opposition to its authority, which may also lead 
to violence.  
The events that took place at Singur and Nandigram ensemble such an argument. However, one 
needs to closely look at the developments that may have contributed to such a crisis. This also 
necessitates an analysis as to whether the dominance that the party enjoyed in West Bengal is 
similar to the ‘hegemony’ as depicted by Gramsci. 
‘Hegemony’ to Gramsci means ‘leadership of the class alliance’ (Forgacs 2000; p: 422). It is more 
linked to consent (persuasion) as against coercion and direction (leadership) as against domination 
(ibid, p: 423).  The dominant class projects its own interest as the universal interest (Sanyal: 2007; 
                                                 
20 One could argue that the popular unrest stemmed from the anti incumbency factor. However, the temptation to rule it 
out evolves from the fact that the LF has been in power in West Bengal since 1977 and any element of anti incumbency 
would have been manifested within such a long period of time. While there has been some challenges to the LF rule 
over the past decades but that was not sufficient enough to destabilise the left domination in the state.  
21 I owe this argument and the subsequent analysis to a personal interaction with Aditya Nigam (email, dated June 22, 
2010) 
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p: 27). In the context of West Bengal, one could argue that this hegemony of the party was 
established by the primary allegiance it enjoyed from the poor peasants and the working class. The 
peasantry mobilised and politicised during the land struggles of the 1960s and 1970s had instilled 
within the rural poor a sense of loyalty to the CPI-M as its steadfast champion.  
As it has been demonstrated earlier, the CPI-M was able to ensure the political support of the rural 
population by convincing them that the interest of the party, i.e. the LF attaining and remaining in 
power, would also serve the interest of the poor people in the countryside. Often the party mobilised 
its political machinery, sometimes leading to use of force, to ensure the support of the rural 
population. From this perspective, one could see a sense of Gramscian hegemony prevailing in rural 
West Bengal.  
One could also argue that the dominance of the party which is prevalent in West Bengal is also 
different from the Gramscian hegemony. According to Gramsci, hegemony is rooted in the 
‘economically dominant’, yet it also extends beyond ‘economism’ (Forgacs 2000; p: 423). 
However, the policies adopted by the LF in the state for the past three decades were guided mostly 
by class relations and it includes land reforms as well as the recent drive for industrialisation.22   
The crisis in the Gramscian hegemony can be enumerated on two counts. Firstly, for Gramsci, the 
subordinated classes accept the dominant class (also) as the intellectual, cultural and moral leader of 
the society (ibid & Sanyal: 2007; p: 27). One could argue that the process of land acquisition in the 
countryside for industrialisation totally depleted the party of the moral and cultural leadership of the 
peasant community.  
The moral leadership of the party was put to question as there were doubts within the rural society 
as to whether the industrialisation project that the LF envisaged was at all beneficial to them. One 
                                                 
22 One of the major arguments put forward by the LF government in support of industrialisation is the fact that many 
people in the rural community now don’t want to pursue a career in agriculture for a multiplicity of reasons (explained 
earlier). One could see an element of class analysis behind the motive for industrialisation, which, according to the left 
leaders, would ensure that certain section of the population move from one class trajectory to the other i.e. from the 
agricultural to the industrial terrain.  
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should keep in mind that for Gramsci, ‘hegemony’ presupposes that the interests and tendencies of 
the subordinate groups are taken into account (Forgacs 2000; p: 424).  
For the rural community land is of paramount importance and its ownership is seen as a status 
symbol from the socio-cultural point of view. Taking away that land, or even attempting to do so, 
irrespective of what the compensation may be, challenged the authority of the party to provide the 
cultural leadership especially in the rural society.  
Secondly, it has been pointed out by many left thinkers that ‘arrogance and complacence’ within the 
party also resulted in popular protest, leading to its electoral debacle (Datta Gupta, 2009). One 
could argue that these (arrogance and complacence) resulted from a sense of domination and not 
hegemony in the Gramscian sense. Domination is intrinsically related to the use of force and its 
application for retaining control may lead to violence (ibid). This has been a feature of the left rule 
in West Bengal in the wake of the violence that erupted whenever the supremacy of the CPI-M has 
been challenged in the state. One could argue that this refers to a theoretical inability to understand 
the Gramscian distinction between domination and hegemony. This lack of understanding may have 
triggered the crisis within the left in West Bengal.  
 
5.2 Dominance, Subordination and Resistance:  
Under colonial conditions, Dominance was wrongly seen as similar to hegemony (Guha, 1989, p: 
228). One could be tempted to interpret the situation at Singur and Nandigram on similar lines. The 
decision behind land acquisition for industrialisation was taken without the consent of the rural 
population, who would be directly affected by it. Neither was there any effort to persuade those who 
would have to part with their means of livelihood, instead coercive methods were used by sending 
forces to grab agricultural land. Since coercion outweighed persuasion this cannot be construed as a 
true hegemony (ibid, p: 231). 
The LF saw the outcome of the 2006 assembly elections as an endorsement for its drive for 
industrialisation. Now it is almost evident that the poll results in favour of the LF in 2006 were no 
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endorsement for industrialisation initiated by the party following neo-liberal path and resulting in 
exclusion. In fact, one could argue that the poll outcome was wrongly interpreted as a popular 
support in favour of the path followed by the LF for industrialisation   
  Although the timeframe of our current analysis is distinctly different from the theoretical construct 
used by Guha yet one could identify some similarity between the situation of colonial India and that 
which prevailed at Nandigram and Singur.23  
In the framework of such an analysis one could also see the popular protest that followed land 
acquisition as ‘resistance’ (Haynes & Prakash, 1991; pp 1-3)24. The resistance was the outcome of 
several reasons such as, loss of livelihood of the rural population, attack on the dominant culture 
prevalent in the rural society, undemocratic (‘autocratic’, following Guha, 1989, p: 229) attitude of 
the party, denying citizenship rights to the subordinates and exclusion of the subordinates from the 
benefits of the expansion of capital.   
 
 5.3 Tension in Governability under Post Colonial Conditions 
With the emergence of neo-liberalism as a dominant discourse, the predominance of capital over 
other factors of production is seen to be more than ever before. The compression of time and space 
under the current project of globalisation has made capital more expansive. Under post-colonial 
conditions, ‘exclusion’ and ‘marginalisation’ has become integral part of capitalism.  (Sanyal, 2007; 
p: 254).  
In contrast to the traditional Marxist political economy analysis of underdevelopment resulting from 
‘exploitation’ (by way of extraction and appropriation of surplus), Sanyal identifies the ability of 
capital to ‘negotiate’ the social and economic terrains of those who are outside the domain of 
capitalist mode of production and yet continue with the process of primitive accumulation (ibid). 
                                                 
23 The distinction lies in the fact that Guha identifies the dominance-subordination relationship in the context of a 
timeframe, where the role of capital was ‘marginal’ in the mode of production and in the current context capital is all 
pervasive.  
24 In the context of subaltern studies, when the subordinate groups, by their behaviour and cultural practices, challenge 
the hegemonic social formations and threaten to unravel the strategies of domination then its called Resistance (Haynes 
& Prakash, ,1991, p: 3).  
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The ‘dispossessed’, those who remain outside the domain of the capitalist mode of production, are 
confined within, what Sanyal describes as, the ‘need economy’ (ibid; pp: 215).25 He highlights this 
as strength of the capital, which carries out primitive accumulation despite the presence of a non-
capitalist need economy.  (ibid; p: 254)26. The ‘need economy’, according to Sanyal, is served by 
‘welfarist governmentality’.27  
He foregrounds the analysis that, in contrast to the historicist analysis of underdevelopment, in a 
post colonial setting there is a continuous process of primitive accumulation but it is also 
accompanied by a parallel process of reversal of its effects (ibid, pp: 254-55). 
Using the theoretical framework used by Sanyal, one could argue that the protest that took place in 
West Bengal following the drive for industrialisation highlights the failure of governmentality. The 
inability of the LF government to take care of the people who were vulnerable following land 
acquisition -- this is failure in ‘governmentality’--.has resulted in vigorous protests.  
Here one can highlight the debate surrounding compensation and the disadvantage that the 
agricultural labourers and sharecroppers were subjected to in the process. This can be construed as 
what Sanyal describes as ‘exclusion and marginalisation’ i.e. those who are loosing their livelihood 
are denied any substantial benefit that was expected from industrialisation.  Within a democratic set 
up such marginalisation can transform the vulnerable into ‘dangerous classes’ (Chatterjee, 2008, p: 
53-55) and it is also contradictory to the narrative of inclusive development that has been espoused 
by the Indian left.   
 5.4 New Social Movements and Antagonism:  
Social movements mobilise social power to usher in social transformation. New social movements 
are new democratic struggles as they seek to ensure equality (Mouffe, 1988, pp: 89-100). Any 
social relation, which is subjected to subordination, may involve antagonism.  In the presence of a 
                                                 
25 Sanyal conceptualises the need economy as an economic space ‘constituting an outside of capital.’   
26 Partha Chatterjee (2008, p: 55) says that the benefits provided to the poor people either in the form of subsidised 
food, employment guarantee or easy credit from the government or non-governmental organisations is aimed at 
compensating for the negative impact that primitive accumulation might have had on them. 
27 By’governmentality’, I refer to production of citizens by the state and transferring to them the rights of the citizenry.  
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new social movement, such antagonism is reflected against the hegemonic formation, which is 
subversive of democracy. Here I also bring in the ‘multiple subjectivities’ of individuals as 
envisaged by Mouffe (ibid; pp: 89-90) as opposed to class reductionism of the classical Marxists. 
This entails that the same individual can be part of protests organised under various social 
movements.  
In the backdrop of such a framework, one could argue that protests in West Bengal also emanated 
from the antagonism of various social movements, (against one or more dominant formations) 
which are at play at different societal levels. Different social movements may have diverse 
objectives but one could identify a common string of opposition to the action of the hegemonic 
formation (here the LF government). (Baviskar, 2005, pp: 165).  
The social movements could range from the vulnerable people, various political parties with 
differing ideologies, activists opposed to growth based on neo-liberalism, environmentalists and the 
likes. Hence it is difficult to analyse them within the parameters of a single narrative (Nielsen, 
2009, pp: 467), rather they need to be understood as ‘overlapping spheres’ within the broader space 
of movement.  
As events in Nandigram and Singur have demonstrated, convergence of these movements could 
intensify the protest and mutual differences could create tension among the overlapping spheres. 
However, attributing the popular mobilisation to one single narrative could be detrimental in 
understanding the real magnitude of such movements (ibid, p: 468). I would argue that the way by 
which the LF put the onus of the instability entirely on the TMC and the Maoists resulted in its 
inability to comprehend the real scale of the unrest and this also contributed to the strengthening of 
the popular protest. 
6. Conclusion 
Paper starts with neo-liberalism political philosophy and the movement of the civil society and the 
effect of the Left Front embracing neo-liberalism, which is paradoxical with the political doctrine of 
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the CPI-M. However, the crisis is much deep-rooted and goes beyond the physical space that anti- 
land acquisition protests occupy.   
The paper points out that the crisis within the left stems more from within, i.e. the policies 
undertaken by the LF government over the years. Paper has analysed how land reform has impeded 
rural capital formation and also failed to resist marginalisation of the peasantry. The measure, along 
with the introduction of the Panchayati Raj, however, transformed the nature of the rural society, 
creating a class which helped the party to retain its domination, through patron-client relationship, 
despite not being able to deliver the level of economic growth necessary for moving to the next 
stage of development. A similar class also emerged in the urban space.  
With the emergence of a middle class, exposed to world-wide prosperity following globalisation 
and technological development, and the increased aspirations of those who benefited from the left 
rule, the LF was under pressure to create jobs in the industrial and the service sectors. This paper 
has shown how the lack of adequate capital formation in the state in a way forced the LF to lure 
private capital by providing them with several benefits. This caused resentment among the core 
support base of the LF, i.e. the rural and urban poor. They protested against the loss of livelihood 
and dignity of life and subsequently the LF’s position of moral authority to represent the poor and 
the downtrodden was challenged. Lack of adequate job creation, because of technological 
development, also could not satisfy either the middle class or those who benefited from the left rule.  
Thus the politics of exclusion and marginalisation came into play as most of the population were 
left out of the circuit of development that the LF was planning to embark upon. This paper has 
argued that this led to widespread disenchantment resulting in popular protests, which reached a 
climax with the violence at Nandigram.  
The intelligentsia, who have been traditional supporters of the left, provided the necessary 
intellectual and moral support to those who were protesting against the exclusionary model of 
industrialisation. Although the moral authority of the LF to represent the peasantry and the working 
class was already in question but given the position the intellectuals occupy in Bengali society their 
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public protests against the LF came in a way as a final endorsement of the criticism that the CPI-M 
no longer represented the ‘proletariats’. The intellectuals thus played the role of a catalyst to expose 
the crisis which was already brewing within the left. 
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